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Trita Parsi was reporting to Iranian ambassador

Hassan Dai, 23 Jan. 2013

These email exchanges between Parsi and Iranian ambassador Javad Zarif suggest that Parsi was passing information to Iranian ambassador. It seems that Parsi profited from his work in Bob Ney's office to collect information and send it to Zarif


In 2008, the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and its president Trita Parsi filed a defamation lawsuit against me. They lost the suit and were punished for lying to the court and other discovery abuses.. The discovery process unearthed very valuable documents that clarify the working of NIAC and the relation of its president with influential people connected to the Iranian regime. Some of these documents raise serious concerns about the possible threat that Parsi’s connections has on US national security.  Some examples follow.

In September 2006, George Bush nominated John Bolton as the future US ambassador to UN but the Senate was reluctant to approve his nomination. This issue was very important for the Iranian regime as Boton preached a harsh stance against Iran.

On September 28, 2006 Trita Parsi sent an email to Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian ambassador at the United Nation. The email contained a press report that the “UN Envoy Bolton Unlikely to Get US Senate Vote”. So far nothing alarming.  

But in addition to the press report, Parsi added his personal note and informed Zarif: “from what I hear, the below article still stands.”  Parsi meant that his personal info confirmed that the Senate will not vote for Bolton. At that time, Parsi worked in Congressman Bob Ney's office and his email shows that he was sending information obtained in US Congress to the Iranian ambassador.

A few weeks later, Parsi reported to the Iranian envoy Zarif about the lawmakers who had decided to oppose George Bush policy on Iran. This October 25, 2006 email included:

“Just wanted to check and see if you have seen the draft of the resolution?

Also, happy to hear that you will meet with Gilchrest and potentially Leach.

There are many more that are interested in a meeting, including many respectable Democrats. Due to various reasons, they will contact you directly (partly to avoid going through Jeremy Stone). Their larger goal is to meet with Iranian elected parliamentarians.

Gilchrest is a great guy, low key but very respected among Republicans as well as the Democrats. These members are very disillusioned with the Bush foreign policy and are tired to sit on the sidelines as Bush undermines the US’s global position. As a result, they are willing to take matters in their own hands and they accept the political risk that comes with it.”

The next day, Zarif responded to Parsi: “I am always open to these meetings.  Your help is always welcome.  I leave the modalities to your discretion.”

The most alarming email is dated 23 August. Zarif is back from a trip to Tehran and has brought a secret response to Congress members who met with him earlier in the summer. Parsi wrote to Zarif:

“Hope all is well and that you are back from Tehran. Would love to get a chance to see the proposal or to understand more what it entails. If it is substantial, then certainly members of Congress may find it a reasonable offer, even if the White House doesn’t. tp”

This email points to a high level of secrecy and trust between Parsi and Zarif. While we can bet on the Iranian regime having many people in the United States reporting to them, it becomes particularly alarming when a man with extensive access to congressmen and women , senators and the governmental officials looks like the Tehran’s ears in Washington.