From: McGlinchey, Daniel [Daniel.McGlinchey@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Saturday, March 07, 2009 1:20 AM
To: tparsi@jhu.edu
Cc: McGlinchey, Daniel
Subject: Fw: INFORMAL unofficial witness invite letter
Attachments: HR 1327, Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2009.pdf; WITNESS LIST FOR HR 1327 IRAN HEARING.doc

Dear Mr Parsi,

I apologize for getting your email address wrong when I sent out the email below to our panel of four witnesses before I left the office tonight. (I didn't know that I had gotten it wrong until I received a "MAILER-DAEMON could not send message" email just about an hour ago.)

If you would, could you please acknowledge that you received this email WITH the attachments that are referenced? I'll also be resending a second email that I sent out subsequent to the first one.

My apologies.

Regards,
Daniel McGlinchey
:House Financial Services Committee
202-225-3548

Daniel McGlinchey
House Financial Services Committee
Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman
202.225.3548

From: McGlinchey, Daniel
To: 'Deutch.ted@flsenate.gov' <Deutch.ted@flsenate.gov>; 'tdeutch@gmail.com' <tdeutch@gmail.com>; 'ordefk@yahoo.com' <ordefk@yahoo.com>; 'tparsi@hu.edu' <tparsi@hu.edu>; 'isaacsonj@ajc.org' <isaacsonj@ajc.org>
Sent: Fri Mar 06 18:31:00 2009
Subject: INFORMAL unofficial witness invite letter

Dear Witnesses,

I just wanted to make sure before the weekend starts that you all had a copy of HR 1327, the legislation that will be the focus of our hearing next Thursday, March 12th at 10:00 am in 2220 Rayburn. So I've attached the legislation (which I believe you all already have) along with the most current witness list, to which one more witness could be added if the minority requests one.

Also, since the official witness invite letters won't be sent out until Monday morning, I thought I'd give you the highlights now. The letter will essentially confirm your invitation to testify at the hearing and explain that the hearing will focus on the H.R. 1327, "The Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2009."

The general directive the letter gives with regard to your testimony is simple and the same for everyone: "The Committee would be interested in hearing your views on this legislation – its goals, its approach, and what you think its contribution would be to the overall effort to continue to put pressure on the Iranian regime." The language is intentionally general to allow and encourage each witness to say whatever it is he thinks about the bill (good, bad, how to make it better, etc), through your own particular optic, while bringing your own experience to bear on the question.

Legislation very similar to HR 1327 passed the House twice in the last Congress. Those two bills were a bit different from each other, and the new bill, HR 1327, is also a little different from each of them – although they all share the same basic principles and goals.

Under separate cover, I'll send you the transcript of the mark-up session held last Congress on HR 2347, the Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2007, and a few news articles about our efforts at the time.

Regards,

Daniel McGlinchey
Senior Professional Staff Member
House Committee on Financial Services
Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman
202.225.3548

(Original Signature of Member)

111TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 1327

To authorize State and local governments to direct divestiture from, and prevent investment in, companies with investments of $20,000,000 or more in Iran's energy sector, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (for himself, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SHERMAN, and Mr. MEEKS of New York) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on ______________

A BILL

To authorize State and local governments to direct divestiture from, and prevent investment in, companies with investments of $20,000,000 or more in Iran's energy sector, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2009".

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds as follows:

(1) There is an increasing interest by States, local governments, educational institutions, and private institutions to seek to disassociate themselves from companies that directly or indirectly support the Government of Iran's efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.

(2) Policy makers and fund managers may find moral, prudential, or reputational reasons to divest from companies that accept the business risk of operating in countries that are subject to international economic sanctions or that have business relationships with countries, governments, or entities with which any United States company would be prohibited from dealing because of economic sanctions imposed by the United States.

SEC. 3. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO DIVEST FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES INVESTED IN IRAN'S ENERGY SECTOR.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to support the decision of State governments, local governments, and educational institutions to divest from, and to prohibit the investment of assets they control in, persons that have investments of more than $20,000,000 in Iran's energy sector.

(b) AUTHORITY TO DIVEST.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a State or local government may adopt and enforce measures that meet the requirements of subsection (d) to divest the assets of the State or local government from, or prohibit investment of the assets of the State or local government in, any person that the State or local government determines, using credible information available to the public, engages in investment activities in Iran described in subsection (c).

(c) INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES IN IRAN DESCRIBED.—A person engages in investment activities in Iran described in this subsection if the person—

(1) has an investment of $20,000,000 or more—

(A) in the energy sector of Iran; or

(B) in a person that provides oil or liquified natural gas tankers, or products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquified natural gas, for the energy sector in Iran; or

(2) is a financial institution that extends $20,000,000 or more in credit to another person, for 45 days or more, if that person will use the credit to invest in the energy sector in Iran.

(d) REQUIREMENTS.—The requirements referred to in subsection (b) that a measure taken by a State or local government must meet are the following:

(1) NOTICE.—The State or local government shall provide written notice to each person to whom the State or local government, as the case may be, intends to apply the measure, of such intent.

(2) TIMING.—The measure shall apply to a person not earlier than the date that is 90 days after the date on which the person receives the written notice required by paragraph (1).

(3) OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING.—The State or local government shall provide each person referred to in paragraph (1) with an opportunity to demonstrate to the State or local government, as the case may be, that the person does not engage in investment activities in Iran described in subsection (c). If the person demonstrates to the State or local government that the person does not engage in investment activities in Iran described in subsection (c), the measure shall not apply to the person.

(4) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON AVOIDING ERRONEOUS TARGETING.—It is the sense of the Congress that a State or local government should not adopt a measure under subsection (b) with respect

to a person unless the State or local government has made every effort to avoid erroneously targeting the person and has verified that the person engages in investment activities in Iran described in subsection (c).

(e) NOTICE TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.—Not later than 30 days after adopting a measure pursuant to subsection (b), a State or local government shall submit to the Attorney General of the United States a written notice which describes the measure.

(f) NONPREEMPTION.—A measure of a State or local government authorized under subsection (b) is not preempted by any Federal law or regulation.

(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) INVESTMENT.—The "investment" of assets, with respect to a State or local government, includes—

(A) a commitment or contribution of assets;

(B) a loan or other extension of credit; or

(C) the entry into or renewal of a contract for goods or services.

(2) ASSETS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term "assets" refers to public monies and includes any pension, retirement, annuity, or endowment fund, or similar instrument, that is controlled directly or indirectly by a State or local government.

(B) EXCEPTION.—The term "assets" does not include employee benefit plans covered by title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).

(h) EFFECTIVE DATE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), this section shall apply to measures adopted by a State or local government before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) NOTICE REQUIREMENTS.—Subsections (d) and (e) apply to measures adopted by a State or local government on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 4. SAFE HARBOR FOR CHANGES OF INVESTMENT POLICIES BY ASSET MANAGERS.

Section 13(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a–13(c)(1)) is amended by inserting before the period the following: "or engage in investment activities in Iran described in section 3(c) of the Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2009".

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CERTAIN ERISA PLAN INVESTMENTS.

It is the sense of Congress that a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan, as defined in section 3(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002(3)), may divest plan assets from, or avoid investing plan assets in, any person the fiduciary determines engages in investment activities in Iran described in section 3(c) of this Act, without breaching the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon the fiduciary by section 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104), if—

(1) the fiduciary makes such determination using credible information that is available to the public; and

(2) such divestment or avoidance of investment is conducted in accordance with section 2509.94–1 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act).

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) ENERGY SECTOR.—The term "energy sector" refers to activities to develop petroleum or natural gas resources or nuclear power.

(2) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term "financial institution" has the meaning given that term in section 14(5) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

(3) IRAN.—The term "Iran" includes any agency or instrumentality of Iran.

(4) PERSON.—The term "person" means—

(A) a natural person, corporation, company, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group;

(B) any governmental entity or instrumentality of a government, including a multilateral development institution (as defined in section 1701(c)(3) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(3))); and

(C) any successor, subunit, parent company, or subsidiary of any entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

(5) STATE.—The term "State" means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

(6) STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT.—The term "State or local government" includes—

(A) any State and any agency or instrumentality thereof;

(B) any local government within a State, and any agency or instrumentality thereof;

(C) any other governmental instrumentality; and

(D) any public institution of higher education within the meaning of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).

SEC. 7. SUNSET.

This Act shall terminate 30 days after the date on which the President has certified to the Congress that—

(1) the Government of Iran has ceased providing support for acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a state-sponsor of terrorism for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law; or

(2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear, biological, and chemical

weapons and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology.

Witness List for legislative hearing on HR 1327, Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2009

The Honorable Ted Deutch [Note: Government Witnesss]
Senator, The Florida Senate
15340 Jog Road, Suite 201
Delray Beach, FL 33446-2170

Deutch.ted@flsenate.gov
tdeutch@gmail.com
cell: 561-866-6286

Professor Orde F. Kittrie
Professor of Law, Arizona State University
Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law
Arizona State University
P.O. Box 877906
Tempe, Arizona 85287

ordefk@yahoo.com
phone: 202-222-5178

Trita Parsi
President, National Iranian-American Council
1411 K St. NW Ste 600
Washington, DC 20005

phone: 202-386-6325
tparsi@hu.edu

Jason Isaacson
Director of Government and International Affairs
American Jewish Committee
1156 15th Street NW Suite 1201
Washington DC 20010

202.785.5490
isaacsonj@ajc.org

One possible additional witness, at Republicans' request ???

From: Segel, James [James.Segel@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Thursday, March 05, 2009 3.56 PM
To: tparsi@jhu.edu
Cc: McGlinchey, Daniel
Subject: FW: Iran Sanctions Enabling Act (draft form)
Attachments: Iran Sanctions Enabling Act -- 111th Congress -- March 5, 1pm.doc

Mr Parsi,I am enclosing a copy of the bill that will be heard on March 12 at 10:00. We will try to talk on Tuesday afternoon Feel free to give me or Daniel McGlinchey a call if you have questions in the meantime. Jim Segel

---

From: McGlinchey, Daniel
Sent: Thursday, March 05, 2009 3:43 PM
To: Segel, James
Subject: Iran Sanctions Enabling Act (draft form)

Daniel McGlinchey
Senior Professional Staff Member
House Committee on Financial Services
Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman
202.225.3548

111th CONGRESS
H. R. xxxx

To authorize State and local governments to direct divestiture from, and prevent investment in, companies with investments of $20,000,000 or more in Iran's energy sector, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (for himself, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SHERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services, and in addition to the Committees on Education and Labor and Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

---

A BILL

To authorize State and local governments to direct divestiture from, and prevent investment in, companies with investments of $20,000,000 or more in Iran's energy sector, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2009'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds as follows:

(1) There is an increasing interest by States, local governments, educational institutions, and private institutions to seek to disassociate themselves from companies that directly or indirectly support the Government of Iran's efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.

(2) Policy makers and fund managers may find moral, prudential, or reputational reasons to divest from companies that accept the business risk of operating in countries that are subject to international economic sanctions or that have business relationships with countries, governments, or entities with which any United States company would be prohibited from dealing because of economic sanctions imposed by the United States.

SEC. 3. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO DIVEST FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES INVESTED IN IRAN'S ENERGY SECTOR.

(a) Statement of Policy- It is the policy of the United States to support the decision of State governments, local governments, and educational institutions to divest from, and to prohibit the investment of assets they control in, persons that have investments of more than $20,000,000 in Iran's energy sector.

(b) Authority to Divest- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a State or local government may adopt and enforce measures that meet the requirements of subsection (d) to divest the assets of the State or local government from, or prohibit investment of the assets of the State or local government in, any person that the State or local government determines, using credible information available to the public, engages in investment activities in Iran described in subsection (c).

(c) Investment Activities Described- A person engages in investment activities in Iran described in this subsection if the person--

(1) has an investment of $20,000,000 or more--

(A) in the energy sector of Iran; or

(B) in a person that provides oil or liquified natural gas tankers, or products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquified natural gas, for the energy sector in Iran; or

(2) is a financial institution that extends $20,000,000 or more in credit to another person, for 45 days or more, if that person will use the credit to invest in the energy sector in Iran.

(d) Requirements- The requirements referred to in subsection (b) that a measure taken by a State or local government must meet are the following:

(1) NOTICE- The State or local government shall provide written notice to each person to which a measure is to be applied.

(2) TIMING- The measure shall apply to a person not earlier than the date that is 90 days after the date on which written notice is provided to the person under paragraph (1).

(3) OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING- The State or local government shall provide an opportunity to comment in writing to each person to which a measure is to be applied. If the person demonstrates to the State or local government that the person does not engage in investment activities in Iran

described in subsection (c), the measure shall not apply to the person.

(4) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AVOIDING ERRONEOUS TARGETING- It is the sense of Congress that a State or local government should not adopt a measure under subsection (b) with respect to a person unless the State or local government has made every effort to avoid erroneously targeting the person and has verified that the person engages in investment activities in Iran described in subsection (c).

(e) Notice to Department of Justice- Not later than 30 days after adopting a measure pursuant to subsection (b), a State or local government shall submit written notice to the Attorney General describing the measure.

(f) Nonpreemption- A measure of a State or local government authorized under subsection (b) is not preempted by any Federal law or regulation.

(g) Definitions- In this section:

(1) INVESTMENT- The `investment' of assets, with respect to a State or local government, includes--

(A) a commitment or contribution of assets;

(B) a loan or other extension of credit; or

(C) the entry into or renewal of a contract for goods or services.

(2) ASSETS-

(A) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term `assets' refers to public monies and includes any pension, retirement, annuity, or endowment fund, or similar instrument, that is controlled directly or indirectly by a State or local government.

(B) EXCEPTION- The term `assets' does not include employee benefit plans covered by title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).

(h) Effective Date-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2), this section applies to measures adopted by a State or local government before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) NOTICE REQUIREMENTS- Subsections (d) and (e) apply to measures adopted by a State or local government on or after the date of the enactment of

this Act.

SEC. 4. SAFE HARBOR FOR CHANGES OF INVESTMENT POLICIES BY ASSET MANAGERS.

(a) In General- Section 13(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-13(c)(1)) is amended to read as follows:

> `(1) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, no person may bring any civil, criminal, or administrative action against any registered investment company, or any employee, officer, director, or investment adviser thereof, based solely upon the investment company divesting from, or avoiding investing in, securities issued by persons that the investment company determines, using credible information available to the public, engage in investment activities in Iran described in section 3(c) of this Act.'.

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CERTAIN ERISA PLAN INVESTMENTS.

It is the sense of Congress that a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan, as defined in section 3(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002(3)), may divest plan assets from, or avoid investing plan assets in, any person the fiduciary determines engages in investment activities in Iran described in section 202(c) of this title, without breaching the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon the fiduciary by section 404 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1104), if--

(1) the fiduciary makes such determination using credible information that is available to the public; and

(2) such divestment or avoidance of investment is conducted in accordance with section 2509.94-1 of title 29, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act).

SEC. 6 DEFINITIONS.

In this title:

(1) ENERGY SECTOR- The term `energy sector' refers to activities to develop petroleum or natural gas resources or nuclear power.

(2) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION- The term `financial institution' has the meaning given that term in section 14(5) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

(3) IRAN- The term `Iran' includes any agency or instrumentality of Iran.

(4) PERSON- The term `person' means--

(A) a natural person, corporation, company, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, organization, or group;

(B) any governmental entity or instrumentality of a government, including a multilateral development institution (as defined in section 1701(c)(3) of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(3))); and

(C) any successor, subunit, parent company, or subsidiary of any entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

(5) STATE- The term `State' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

(6) STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT- The term `State or local government' includes--

(A) any State and any agency or instrumentality thereof;

(B) any local government within a State, and any agency or instrumentality thereof;

(C) any other governmental instrumentality; and

(D) any public institution of higher education within the meaning of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).

SEC. 7. SUNSET.

This Act shall terminate 30 days after the date on which the President has certified to Congress that—

(1) the Government of Iran has ceased providing support for acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a state-sponsor of terrorism for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or any other provision of law; or

(2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology.

END

From: Patrick Disney [PDisney@niacouncil.org]
Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2009 5:49 PM
To: Rose, Markus
Cc: 'Emily L Blout'
Subject: RE: thanks for meeting yesterday
Attachments: Divestment Talking Points FINAL pdf; Washington Times 2.25.09 Divestment letter.pdf; Sanctions-Happy USA.pdf; IPS. Neocons driving Iran divestment campaign.docx

Hi Markus,

Here are a few things for you to look at regarding divestment. Attached are NIAC talking points as well as a letter to the editor we had published today in the Washington Times along with the National Foreign Trade Council, who I'm sure is already in touch with your office. Also two articles with lots of good background.

Our concerns are very straightforward: sanctions and divestment could scuttle whatever prospects we have now for successful diplomacy. They give Iran an excuse to refuse to come to the table and make it less likely we'll find a solution. Also, it just doesn't make sense to try this during the current recession, which is why all the major business and trade groups agree with us.

Bill Reinsch from NFTC made a good point in a letter he wrote awhile ago:

> At its core, this type of enabling legislation is bad public policy. By encouraging State funds to depart from the underlying fiduciary responsibilities of money management, and by injecting social or political criteria into investment decisions, Congress threatens to complicate the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and impart selective mandates on pension funds that will ill-serve investors and pensioners down the road. Foreign policy sanctions by States not only undermine the ability of the U.S. to speak with one voice but also frustrate cooperation with U.S. trading partners who often see them as a violation of U.S. international commitments and who are prompted to enact blocking statutes or otherwise retaliate against U.S. interests.

Thanks for hearing us out on this. Best,

-patrick

From: Rose, Markus [mailto:Markus.Rose@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2009 10:15 PM
To: PDisney@niacouncil.org; EBlout@niacouncil.g.dreamhost.com
Subject: Re: thanks for meeting yesterday

Send me some written material with your concerns about the sanctions bill I will make sure Daniel and BF see it I meet w FSC staff and BF on Thursday to discuss international FSC agenda for the year.

From: Patrick Disney

To: Rose, Markus
Sent: Mon Feb 23 14:56:11 2009
Subject: RE: thanks for meeting yesterday
Thanks Markus I left a message with Daniel on Friday, but haven't heard back. If you could pass along my information so we might be able to talk some time this week, I'd appreciate it. Thanks,

-patrick

Patrick Disney
Assistant Legislative Director
National Iranian American Council
1411 K Street NW, Suite 600
Washington DC, 20005

Tel: 202 386 6325
Direct: 202 379 1638
www.NIACouncil.org

From: Rose, Markus [mailto:Markus.Rose@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 1:54 PM
To: Patrick Disney
Cc: eblout@niacouncil.org
Subject: RE: thanks for meeting yesterday

Hi Patrick,

Got your message on Iran sanctions bill My understanding is that BF will be reintroducing it soon Lead staffer on it is Daniel McGlinchey with the FS Committee.
I'll be glad to pass along any information that you want, or you may wish to try to contact him yourself (225-4247).

Markus

National Iranian American Council

Advancing the interests of the Iranian-American Community

NIAC Talking Points:
Iran Divestment

Divestment takes money away from our teachers, police, and other civil servants. Public employees invest in state pensions expecting to receive the greatest possible returns, but divestment limits the options available to them, increases administrative costs, and has an inherently negative impact on investment potential. Rather than upholding the basic fiduciary responsibility to maximize shareholder benefits, proponents of divestment are trying to turn individuals' pension plans into a vehicle for political activism.

"South Africa-style" divestment simply won't work for Iran. Divestment was an effective tool against South Africa's apartheid government because its international reputation made it susceptible to influence. Iran is already a pariah state and feels it has nothing to lose among the international community. *Since Iran is not susceptible to the threat of isolation, divestment won't give us any more leverage than we already have.*

As the US steps out, Russia and China will step in. Divestment will force companies that are concerned about their reputations out of Iran leaving the vacuum to be filled by unscrupulous Russian and Chinese businesses motivated by profit alone. The net financial impact on Tehran will be essentially zero, while also eliminating the potential for ethical companies to exert a positive influence on Iran.

We need to engage, not punish, our allies. Divestment will hurt our European allies at exactly the time when we are asking them to join with us in putting pressure on Iran. The US has no hope of gaining the strong support of our allies while we slap their major businesses with harsh financial penalties. *A unified, multilateral approach to Iran has a far greater chance of resolving the nuclear dispute than divesting US assets ever could.*

Divestment would make us the "Divided States of America." Authorizing State and local divestiture is akin to creating individual, separate foreign policies for each State and municipality. This can only lead to inconsistencies and contradictions in our approach to the world. The federal government is constitutionally responsible for foreign policy and therefore is able to present one uniform message to our allies and our enemies. *Relegating foreign policy to the states means one nation under fifty policies.*

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The Washington Times

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

LETTER TO EDITOR: Don't punish American workers

The Dow dropped 6.2 percent last week, American companies are bleeding 600,000 jobs per month, and whole economies are crumbling under the weight of the global recession. At a time that clearly demands American leadership, Mark D. Wallace ("Reverse 'oil weapon' on Iran," Op-Ed, Friday) proposes bold action on the part of all Americans - that will make everything worse.

Mr. Wallace's United Against Nuclear Iran proposes that Americans sell off their stock in major companies, turning as-yet-unrealized losses into real money down the drain. All because these global businesses may do some indirect trade with Iran - something U.S. law does not prohibit.

To be clear, the Iranian government's nuclear program, human rights violations and support for terrorism are all serious concerns. However, punishing American workers - in the middle of the greatest recession since the 1930s - shows reckless disregard for the immediate problems of ordinary Americans. The solution to the Iranian challenge lies in working with our allies - not punishing their companies or our own work force.

BILL REINSCH

National Foreign Trade Council/USA*Engage

PATRICK DISNEY

National Iranian American Council

Peterson Institute for International Economics

Policy Briefs

Sanctions-Happy USA

by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Peterson Institute

July 1998

Reprinted from The Washington Post, *Outlook Section, July 12, 1998.*

Stating the obvious, President Clinton recently lamented that the United States has become "sanctions happy." Clinton, of course, is the same president who has signed laws for new punitive measures against India, Pakistan, Cuba, Iran and Libya and has used his executive powers to add to the rich legacy of sanctions inherited from past occupants of the White House.

No country in the world has employed sanctions as often as the United States has. The American infatuation with economic sanctions was sparked by President Woodrow Wilson when he was trying to sell the idea of the League of Nations to his countrymen, together with its newly crafted economic weaponry. Wilson famously declared in 1919: "A nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy." America didn't buy the League—the Senate refused to ratify U.S. membership in that precursor to the United Nations—but as the decades rolled on, America adopted Wilson's idea of sanctions as a diplomatic tool.

During this century, the United States has imposed economic sanctions more than 110 times. Economic sanctions entail the denial of customary export, import or financial relations with a target country in an effort to change the country's laws or policies. For example, the United States may seek to block World Bank or International Monetary Fund loans in an effort to stem nuclear proliferation (India and Pakistan); or it may restrict trade with a country to change its human rights policies (Argentina, Chile and China). The current inventory of U.S. sanctions covers 26 target countries, accounting for over half of the world's population (see table). Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Congress has felt freer to interfere in foreign policy, instructing the president on the minute details of imposing and waiving sanctions. In short, whenever tensions rise, sanctions become the favorite tonic of American diplomacy.

What have we learned from this grand experiment in the diplomatic laboratory? Quite a lot. First, as a substitute for military force—the Wilsonian notion—sanctions seldom achieve the desired change in the conduct of foreign countries. In plain language: Wilson was wrong. Perhaps one episode in five results in discernible changes abroad that can be traced to sanctions. The most recent qualified success was the election of Andres Pastrana as president of Colombia last month, following several years of U.S. sanctions directed personally against his predecessor, Ernesto Samper. Charging that Samper had accepted $6 million from the Cali drug cartel for his 1994 presidential campaign, the United States disqualified Colombia as a recipient of U.S. aid and took the unusual step of revoking Samper's entry visa, in effect declaring him persona non grata. These steps were, of course, not the only reason for Pastrana's victory, and probably not the major reason, but they were a contributing factor. Against this qualified success must be listed many unqualified failures: Haiti, Cuba, Libya, Iran, Iraq and China, to name the most prominent.

"... sanctions seldom achieve the desired change in the conduct of foreign countries."

Advocates of sanctions offer South Africa as their favorite example. Economic sanctions were not the deciding factor, but they helped pressure F.W. de Klerk to concede power to Nelson Mandela in 1994. Why doesn't the South African experience translate to Burma, Sudan, India and other miscreants? One reason is that South African sanctions were multilateral, not just a U.S. initiative. Another reason is that, even under apartheid, South Africa was semi-democratic, and the white minority cared what the rest of the world thought.

In fact, this is one of the ironies: Democratic countries, where the elite cares what the rest of the world thinks, are far more susceptible to sanctions than authoritarian countries isolated from world opinion. The contrast between Sudan and South Africa, or between Cuba and Colombia, could not be sharper. An unintended consequence of financial sanctions against Pakistan, a weak but semi-democratic state, open to world opinion, is that the penalties may help topple the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif—as Pakistan slips into deep economic depression—and pave the way for a truly authoritarian and fundamentalist regime.

The second lesson from the diplomatic lab is that it is naive to think of sanctions as a substitute for force when dealing with authoritarian powers. Draconian sanctions made little difference to the policies of Manuel Antonio Noriega in Panama, Raoul Cedras in Haiti or Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Only the use of force changed the governments of Panama and Haiti, and pushed Iraq out of Kuwait. The threat of force tempered Saddam's resistance to U.N. arms inspections early in 1998. But far more often, when U.S. presidents impose sanctions, they see them as an isolated measure, not as part of an escalating "force curve"—a steady progression from diplomatic protest, to economic sanctions, to military intervention; at each step, the target country knows worse is yet to come. The result of treating sanctions as a disconnected policy measure is that the United States has acquired a well-deserved reputation for bluffing: If an authoritarian adversary can withstand sanctions, it need not fear a surprise attack.

A third lesson is that economic sanctions can inflict pain on innocent people while at the same time increasing the grip of the leaders we despise. When sanctions are applied broadside—as against Haiti, Cuba and Iraq—the hardest hit are the most vulnerable: the poor, the very young, the very old and the sick. Left unharmed, and often strengthened, are the real targets: the political, military and economic elites.

A fourth lesson is that sanctions applied hard and fast are more likely to succeed (all other circumstances being equal) than sanctions applied soft and slow. But this lesson poses a dilemma. Hard sanctions usually require multilateral cooperation, if not from the U.N. Security Council, at least from the industrial democracies. While the United States may be the sole military superpower, it is not the only economic player. Without the cooperation of Canada, Western Europe and Japan, the United States alone cannot deny a target country key imports, critical markets or vital finance. So the prescription for hard sanctions—sanctions with both economic and moral effect—amounts to a caution against going it alone. On the other hand, multilateral cooperation takes time to arrange, and often is unachievable. Quick U.N. sanctions against Iraq in 1990 were a notable exception; more typical was the measured international response to India's recent nuclear weapons tests.

Another dilemma posed by the "hard and fast" lesson is that in circumstances where sanctions alone have the best chance of success—against societies that are semi-democratic and open to world opinion—it goes against the American spirit to pile on. Instead, we prefer to escalate sanctions slowly so as to give leaders of the target countries time to reconsider. This tactic also gives them time to take evasive measures.

So why not just muddle along with our sanctions policy? After all, in the view of many American officials, the United States has a special responsibility to deal with misdeeds in many places, ranging from religious persecution in Russia and China to despots in Cuba and Burma. But since military force is too costly and diplomacy is too feeble, why not apply economic sanctions as the global salve to problems abroad and consciences at home? Why not drink the marvelous tonic of foreign policy on the cheap?

The reason, again to quote President Wilson, if not in the sense he intended, is that sanctions are a "terrible remedy." Start with the domestic costs. Estimates made by Kimberly Elliott, Jeffrey Schott and myself indicate that economic sanctions in place today cost the United States some $20 billion in lost exports annually, depriving American workers of some 200,000 well-paid jobs. It would be one thing if these costs were compensated from the public purse, so that everyone shared the burden; it is quite another when the costs are concentrated episodically on individual American firms and communities.

Then consider the morality. U.S. economic sanctions, along with Fidel Castro's own mismanagement, have helped close the income gap between Haiti and Cuba—by driving Cuban living standards downward toward the desperate Haitian level. Speaking of Haiti, that blighted economy has yet to recover from penalties imposed by the first Clinton administration. The multitudinous poor in Iraq, Iran and Vietnam are that much more miserable thanks to prolonged sanctions. With a little resolve, we could also worsen the lives of Nigerians, Indonesians and Burmese. Pope John Paul II had a point when he said during his visit to Cuba in January that the effects of economic sanctions are "always deplorable, because they hurt the most needy"—in effect, that ordinary Cubans, not Castro and his inner circle, are paying the price. The same would happen in these other ill-governed countries.

Finally, the liberal application of sanctions to every cause and country badly erodes U.S. leadership. When the United States applies sanctions to half the world's people, and when it imposes secondary sanctions on allies and friends, it prompts a reaction against American hegemony. Sanctions against China have neither shaken the leadership nor hindered the country's drive for growth. Sanctions against India will have approximately the same lack of effect. And few secondary sanctions do more than irritate U.S. allies. (Americans, above all, should understand symbolic offenses. The tea tax imposed no real economic hardship on colonial Boston. It did inspire a revolution against the greatest power of the day.)

". . . economic sanctions in place today cost the United States some $20 billion in lost exports annually, depriving American workers of some 200,000 well-paid jobs."

Recovery from this love affair will require decisive steps by the White House and the Congress. Clinton appears ready to start the cure, but much more needs to be done. Passage of the sanctions reform bill, introduced last fall by Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Reps. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) and Phil Crane (R-Ill.), would be a useful next step. This bill seeks "to establish an effective framework for consideration by the legislative and executive branches of unilateral economic sanctions." It proposes several sensible guidelines when economic sanctions are considered, either by the president or Congress.

The procedural reforms include increased executive branch consultation with Congress, public hearings, a cost-benefit analysis, a preference for targeted and multilateral measures whenever possible, presidential waivers for all legislatively imposed sanctions and sanctity of contracts. If passed, Hamilton-Lugar would be a landmark law.

But additional steps are still needed:

- The United States should rarely impose sanctions when it cannot get the support of its friends. This Hamilton-Lugar benchmark needs to become standard operating procedure. Ideally, the U.N. Security Council should support the sanctions. At a minimum, the NATO allies, or groups of like-minded states in Latin America, Asia or the Middle East should endorse the effort.
- We should realize that the huge inventory of sanctions now in place could have tremendous value as diplomatic carrots, if the president were able to withdraw them to reward good foreign behavior. For that, the president must have unfettered freedom to lift sanctions step by step. Hamilton-Lugar states that the president "should" have waiver authority when Congress enacts a new sanctions measure. The Justice Department needs to go further than that: It should challenge in court any sanctions legislation that does not contain a national interest waiver that the president can exercise. The Glenn Amendment, mandating sanctions against India and Pakistan for their nuclear explosions, would make an excellent test case. Mandatory legislation of this nature unconstitutionally infringes the president's power in the realm of foreign affairs.
- When dealing with authoritarian regimes, the president should direct sanctions at rulers, not the populace at large. Iraqis are not our enemies. Nor are Cubans. We can single out individuals and agencies that give offense or outrage. We can devise civil and criminal penalties, buttressed by bounties, so that their persons and property are at risk whenever they venture outside their own territory.
- Finally, when the president imposes comprehensive sanctions on an authoritarian regime, he should view those sanctions as a prelude to the exercise of military force, not as a substitute for force. Unless we are prepared to remove bad governments with military force, we have no business heaping prolonged punishment on innocent people.

'A Terrible Remedy'

Ongoing foreign policy sanctions, defined as the "deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations," have been imposed either multilaterally or by the United States on the following nations:

Target Country	Initial Year	Type of Sanctions	Precipitating Event	Key Changes to Sanctions

Angola	1993	Limited trade restrictions (arms and oil embargo); Air and travel sanctions	Failure to implement peace agreement	Air and travel ban (1997); Ban on UNITA diamond exports (1998)
Azerbaijan	1992	Restrictions on financial assistance (including Overseas Private Investment Corp.)	Embargo of Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh	
Burma	1988	Restrictions on aid (including U.S. Export-Import Bank, OPIC), travel restrictions, Ban on trade preferences, Investment ban	Repression of political opposition	Massachusetts state sanctions (1996), Ban on new U.S. investments (1997)
Cambodia	1992	Limited trade restrictions (log boycott; oil embargo)	Failure to implement peace agreement; repression of opposition	Aid reductions (1997)
Cameroon	1992	Restrictions on aid	Repression of opposition	
China	1989	Restrictions on financial assistance, Exim, OPIC; Limited export restrictions	Tiananmen Square massacre	Limited export restrictions (1991)
Cuba	1960	Comprehensive trade and financial sanctions; Secondary sanctions to inhibit foreign investment	Castro-led takeover; military interventions in Africa (1980s); Repression of opposition	Cuban Democracy Act restricts trade of U.S. subsidiaries abroad (1992) Helms-Burton bill codifies embargo; adds secondary sanctions against third-country investors in Cuba (1996)
Gambia	1994	Restrictions on aid	Military coup	
Haiti	1997	Restrictions on aid	Political instability	
India	1998	Ban on financial assistance,including Exim, OPIC; Limited trade restrictions; Ban on bank loans to government; Postponement of non-humanitarian official, multilateral lending	Nuclear weapons tests	

Indonesia	1991	Military aid restrictions; Ban on arms sales	Political repression, especially in East Timor	
Iran	1984	Comprehensive trade and financial sanctions; Secondary sanctions to inhibit foreign investment	Support for terrorism, opposition to peace process in Middle East; efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction	Limited export restrictions (1984) Import boycott added (1987) Total export embargo (1995) Iran-Libya Sanctions Act adds secondary sanctions against foreign firms investing in oil sector (1996)
Iraq	1990	Comprehensive trade and financial sanctions,except limited oil sales under U.N. oil-for-food program	Invasion of Kuwait; post-wardiscovery of extensive program to acquire weapons of mass destruction	
Liberia	1992	Arms embargo	Civil war	
Libya	1978	Comprehensive trade and financial sanctions; Air travel ban	Gadhafi regime support for terrorism; bombing of Pan Am Flight #103	Limited U.S. export restrictions (1978) U.S. boycotts Libyan oil (1982) U.S. imposes comprehensive sanctions (1986) U.N. imposes limited trade sanctions; air travel ban (1992-93) Iran-Libya Sanctions Act adds secondary sanctions against foreign firms investing in oil sector (1996)
Niger	1996	Restrictions on aid	Military coup	
Nigeria	1993	Restrictions on aid;U.S. bans all financial assistance, Exim, OPIC;Restrictions on arms sales;Travel restrictions	Abrogation of election results; execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, other dissidents	

North Korea	1950	Comprehensive trade and financial sanctions	Korean War; possible acquisition of nuclear weapons	U.N. threatens trade and financial sanctions to forestall nuclear weapons acquisition (1993-94)
Pakistan	1979	Ban on financial assistance,OPIC, Ex-Im, export credit guarantees; Ban on bank loans to Pakistan's government; Postponement of non-humanitarian loans	Nuclear weapons program; nuclear weapons tests	U.S. imposes limited sanctions (1979) U.S. waives sanctions during Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1980s) U.S. expands sanctions; G-8 imposes limited sanctions (1998)
Somalia	1992	Arms embargo	Civil war	
Sudan	1988	Comprehensive trade and financial sanctions	Civil war and human rights abuses; support for terrorism	Aid sanctions (1988-89) Comprehensive sanctions (1997)
Syria	1986	Ban on U.S. assistance,including Ex-Im, OPIC; Limited trade restrictions	Support for terrorism	
Vietnam	1954	Denied most-favored-nation status	Vietnam War and aftermath; personnel missing in action	Total trade embargo lifted; other restrictions remain (1994)
Yugoslavia	1991	Comprehensive trade and financial sanctions	Civil war in Bosnia; implementation of Dayton agreement ending Bosnian war; intervention in Kosovo	U.N. trade sanctions lifted, restrictions on multilateral lending, other limited sanctions remain (1995) Additional sanctions imposed against Serbia over Kosovo (1998)
Zaire	1990	Restrictions on aid	Mobutu corruption and suppression of opposition; continued repression under Kabila regime	Sanctions continued after Kabila takeover (1998)

Zambia	1996	Restrictions on aid	Repression of opposition, human rights violations

SOURCE: Institute for International Economics http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=37687

POLITICS-US:
Neo-Cons Driving Iran Divestment Campaign

Jim Lobe

WASHINGTON, May 10 (IPS) - Neo-conservative hawks who championed the invasion of Iraq are leading a new campaign to persuade state and local governments, as well as other institutional investors, to "divest" their holdings in foreign companies and U.S. overseas subsidiaries doing business in Iran.

While stressing that U.S. military action against Iran's nuclear programme should not be taken off the table, they call their divestment strategy the "non-violent tool for countering the Iranian threat".

And, like the run-up to the Iraq war, the campaign has attracted bipartisan support. Democrats, including those who strongly oppose the George W. Bush administration's Iraq policy, see divestment, as well as other proposed economic sanctions against Tehran, as a way to look "tough on Iran" short of going to war.

"I'm not yet ready to suggest the use of military force... but one has to stay on alert that that time could come sooner rather than later," James Woolsey, who served briefly as former President Bill Clinton's CIA director, told an Ohio legislative committee this week in support of a bill that would ban investments by the state's pension funds in companies operating in Iran or in any other country the State Department lists as a state sponsor of terrorism.

"Terror-free investing will not solve the problems... but I think it's an important part of the comprehensive package," added Woolsey, a prominent neo-conservative associated with the like-minded Foundation for the Defence of Democracies (FDD).

The new campaign, the brainchild of the far-right Centre for Security Policy (CSP), is designed to put pressure on the Islamic Republic to abandon its nuclear programme, end its support of anti-Israel groups like Palestinian Hamas and Lebanon's Hezbollah, and "perhaps even to push (it) toward collapse," according to FDD president Clifford May, by depriving it of foreign investment and commercial ties with other countries.

According to a report released here Wednesday by the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute, which is collaborating with the CSP, Iran has signed more than 150 billion dollars worth of investment and commercial contracts with foreign companies based in more than 30 countries since 2000, including more than four billion dollars with U.S. overseas subsidiaries.

The initiative, which is modeled after the anti-apartheid divestment campaign against South Africa of the 1980s, is also backed by major pro-Israel and Jewish groups, including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, and local Jewish Community Relations Councils whose membership is worried that Israel will be threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.

Potentially at stake are billions of dollars controlled by state pension funds and other institutional investors that have invested money in companies -- based mostly in Europe and Asia -- operating in Iran. According to CSP, New York pension funds alone own nearly one billion dollars of stock in three Fortune

500 companies tied to Iran.

"Iran's ability to fund its nuclear programme and sponsor terrorism would come to a grinding halt without revenue gained from foreign investors," according to CSP, which, along with the American Enterprise Institute and FDD, was a leading advocate for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Last year, Missouri became the first state to order one of its pension funds to divest its shares of all companies that do business with Iran and other countries on the State Department's terror list. Last month, both houses of the Florida legislature unanimously approved a bill banning the investment of state funds in companies with commercial ties to Sudan and Iran's energy sector.

Iran-related divestment bills are expected to be approved over the next month by legislatures in Ohio, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and California, according to Christopher Holton, the head of CSP's "Terror-Free Investing" programme. Similar bills are also being considered in the legislatures of Texas, Georgia, Maryland, and New Jersey and will soon be introduced in Michigan and Illinois, he told IPS.

The sudden proliferation of state divestment measures comes amid renewed efforts in Congress to tighten and expand the scope of existing legislation against Iran.

Under the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), which, among other provisions, bans U.S. companies from doing business in Iran, the president is required to impose a range of economic sanctions against foreign companies that invested more than 20 million dollars a year in Iran's energy sector, which accounts for about 80 percent of its foreign-exchange earnings.

The same law, however, permits the president to waive such penalties if he deems it in the national interest. Worried that imposing sanctions would anger key U.S. allies, President Bush has consistently exercised his waiver authority, as his predecessor, Bill Clinton, did before him.

But, as tensions with Iran have increased since the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad nearly two years ago, pressure, especially from neo-conservative groups and the hawkish leadership of the so-called "Israel Lobby", which includes the Christian Right, to take stronger action has grown.

Congress is currently considering several bills that, if passed, would reduce or eliminate the president's waiver authority and include language encouraging divestment drives at the state level.

The administration, which is at least rhetorically committed to working through the U.N. Security Council to impose multilateral sanctions against Iran to rein in its nuclear programme, appears ambivalent on both expanding ISA and on the divestment campaign.

On the one hand, State and Treasury Department officials, using the threat of tougher Congressional action, have informally -- and with some success -- pressed foreign banks, companies, and governments, to forgo or freeze new investments in Iran's energy sector over the past year.

On the other hand, the administration has opposed the pending legislation both because it would reduce the president's flexibility in conducting foreign policy and because imposing sanctions will almost certainly produce a backlash in foreign capitals that would undermine Washington's ability to sustain a united front with its allies and other powers against Iran at the U.N. and in other forums.

"We could not support modifications to (ISA) now being circulated in Congress that would turn the full weight of sanctions not against Iran but against our allies that are instrumental in our coalition against Iran," Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns told a Senate Committee in late March.

In this position, the administration has been strongly supported by the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), a business lobby created by many of the nation's biggest corporations, which has long opposed both unilateral U.S. trade sanctions and state divestment initiatives.

"On one hand, we're asking Europe, Russia, China and Japan to work together with us on this, and, on the other hand, we're beating their companies over the head with a stick," NFTC President William Reinsch told IPS.

In a letter to Ohio lawmakers considering divestment legislation, Reinsch made much the same argument, noting also that, in a case brought by the NFTC, a federal court judge recently struck down as unconstitutional a Sudan divestment law in Illinois on the grounds that it interfered with the federal government's ability to conduct foreign policy and regulate foreign trade.

In his weekly column in the Washington Times published shortly after Reinsch sent his letter, CSP's president, Frank Gaffney, denounced Reinsch as "Terror's lobbyist", charging that the NFTC "favours doing business with America's enemies and runs interference for those determined to do so".

"Iran is already in difficult economic straits; if fully brought to bear, the power of America's capital markets could mightily affect corporate behaviour, undermining -- hopefully, helping to bring down -- the mullahocracy in Iran," wrote Gaffney. (END/2007)

From: Rose, Markus [Markus Rose@mail house gov]

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2009 10:15 PM

To: PDisney@niacouncil org; EBlout@niacouncil g dreamhost com

Subject: Re: thanks for meeting yesterday

Send me some written material with your concerns about the sanctions bill I will make sure Daniel and BF see it. I meet w FSC staff and BF on Thursday to discuss international FSC agenda for the year.

From: Patrick Disney
To: Rose, Markus
Sent: Mon Feb 23 14:56:11 2009
Subject: RE: thanks for meeting yesterday

Thanks Markus. I left a message with Daniel on Friday, but haven't heard back. If you could pass along my information so we might be able to talk some time this week, I'd appreciate it. Thanks,

-patrick

Patrick Disney
Assistant Legislative Director
National Iranian American Council
1411 K Street NW, Suite 600
Washington DC, 20005

Tel: 202 386 6325
Direct: 202 379 1638
www.NIACouncil.org

From: Rose, Markus [mailto:Markus.Rose@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 1:54 PM
To: Patrick Disney
Cc: eblout@niacouncil.org
Subject: RE: thanks for meeting yesterday

Hi Patrick,

Got your message on Iran sanctions bill. My understanding is that BF will be reintroducing it soon. Lead staffer on it is Daniel McGlinchey with the FS Committee.
I'll be glad to pass along any information that you want, or you may wish to try to contact him yourself (225-4247).

Markus

From: Patrick Disney [PDisney@niacouncil.org]
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 2:56 PM
To: Rose, Markus
Subject: RE: thanks for meeting yesterday

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Markus

From: Patrick Disney [PDisney@niacouncil.org]
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 2:00 PM
To: 'David Elliott'
Subject: FW: thanks for meeting yesterday

From: Rose, Markus [mailto:Markus.Rose@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 1:54 PM
To: Patrick Disney
Cc: eblout@niacouncil.org
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Subject: FW: thanks for meeting yesterday

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Cc: eblout@niacouncil.org
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Markus

From: Patrick Disney [PDisney@niacouncil.org]
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 1:59 PM
To: Rose, Markus
Subject: RE: thanks for meeting yesterday

Thanks, Markus. Will be in touch with him soon.

-p

From: Rose, Markus [mailto:Markus.Rose@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 1:54 PM
To: Patrick Disney
Cc: eblout@niacouncil.org
Subject: RE: thanks for meeting yesterday

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Markus

From: Patrick Disney [PDisney@niacouncil org]
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 1:58 PM
To: 'Emily L Blout'
Subject: FW: thanks for meeting yesterday

From: Rose, Markus [mailto:Markus.Rose@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 1:54 PM
To: Patrick Disney
Cc: eblout@niacouncil.org
Subject: RE: thanks for meeting yesterday

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From: Rose, Markus [Markus.Rose@mail.house.gov]

Sent: Friday, February 20, 2009 1:54 PM

To: Patrick Disney

Cc: eblout@niacouncil.org

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Markus

From: Trita Parsi [tparsi@niacouncil.org]
Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2008 9:16 AM
To: eblout@niacouncil.org; 'Patrick Disney'; btalebi@niacouncil.org
Subject: VERY IMPORTANT

Emily - see Franks response to one of our letters. We should make sure he either eliminates Section 3 or gets off of the bill

tp

-----Original Message-----
From: carol coakley [mailto:coakley50@earthlink.net]
Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2008 9:02 AM
To: Trita Parsi
Subject: RE:Ooops- Frank's response

July 2, 2008

Ms. Carol Coakley
50 Bridge Street
Millis, Massachusetts 02054

Dear Ms. Coakley:

I thank you for contacting me about language in the resolution regarding Iran that calls for a blockade of its naval activity. I agree that this should not be our policy, and I regret the fact that I did not read this resolution more carefully. I'm going to consult with the authors to see if a change can be made that would omit this language, and if they are unwilling to do that, I will make very clear my disagreement with this in the most appropriate form. I am grateful to those who called this to my attention. I apologize again for not having read this more carefully.

I do support sanctions against Iran and I disagree with those who think that sanctions are inappropriate. I believe that sanctions appropriately done can have an impact on the behavior of countries whose behavior ought to be changed. The fact that our European allies, and even Russia and China, have agreed with us on the sanctions I think is a testimony to the legitimacy of this approach. But I repeat that I do think we should have a very clear distinction between sanctions and military action or the threat of it, and the blockade clearly falls on the wrong side of that line, so I will be making clear my opposition to that.

BARNEY FRANK

BF/JN

-----Original Message-----
>From: Trita Parsi <tparsi@jhu.edu>
>Sent: Jul 2, 2008 8:59 AM
>To: 'carol coakley' <coakley50@earthlink.net>
>Subject: RE: The alternative to an Israeli attack on Iran-Barney backs off
>
>Would love to see the response!
>

>-----Original Message-----
>From: carol coakley [mailto:coakley50@earthlink.net]
>Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2008 8:17 AM
>To: Trita Parsi
>Subject: Re: The alternative to an Israeli attack on Iran-Barney backs off
>
>I thought you would be interested in Congressman Frank's recent response to an email I sent him.
>I am not sure exactly what "language" he is referring to as I don't think I saved a copy of my email to him. It is the first time in 20 years I've heard him admit a mistake...
>Thanks for your writings. I believe I sent a copy of one of your articles to his aide...
>Carol Coakley
>Millis, MA
>
>

Coal is the most polluting of all fossil fuels and the largest single source of CO_2 in the world. Currently, one-third of all carbon dioxide emissions come from burning coal.

From: Rose, Markus [Markus.Rose@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Thursday, July 03, 2008 11:35 AM
To: Emily L Blout
Subject: Resolution

Here is our reply to people who wrote or called us:

> I thank you for contacting me about language in the resolution regarding Iran that calls for a blockade of its naval activity. I agree that this should not be our policy, and I regret the fact that I did not read this resolution more carefully. I'm going to consult with the authors to see if a change can be made that would omit this language, and if they are unwilling to do that, I will make very clear my disagreement with this in the most appropriate form. I am grateful to those who called this to my attention. I apologize again for not having read this more carefully.
>
> I do support sanctions against Iran and I disagree with those who think that sanctions are inappropriate. I believe that sanctions appropriately done can have an impact on the behavior of countries whose behavior ought to be changed. The fact that our European allies, and even Russia and China, have agreed with us on the sanctions I think is a testimony to the legitimacy of this approach. But I repeat that I do think we should have a very clear distinction between sanctions and military action or the threat of it, and the blockade clearly falls on the wrong side of that line, so I will be making clear my opposition to that.

From: Rose, Markus [Markus Rose@mail house gov]
Sent: Thursday, September 25, 2008 5:19 PM
To: Emily L Blout
Subject: RE: Your help needed on Iran blockade resolution

I was told that Berman intends to bring up the Dodd/Shelby amendment to the Senate's DOD authorization bill. I believe that is S. 3001, amendment No. 5572.

From: Emily L Blout [mailto:eblout@niacouncil.org]
Sent: Thursday, September 25, 2008 4:55 PM
To: Rose, Markus
Subject: RE: Your help needed on Iran blockade resolution

Thanks Markus! Do you have the language?

—
Emily Blout

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National Iranian American Council
1411 K Street NW. Suite 600
Washington, DC 20005
main: 202 386 6325
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From: Rose, Markus [mailto:Markus.Rose@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Thursday, September 25, 2008 4:35 PM
To: Emily L Blout
Subject: RE: Your help needed on Iran blockade resolution

I will find out, I know that our bill language is supposed to be in there I haven't heard anything about H.Res 362 (I doubt it very much)

From: Emily L Blout [mailto:eblout@niacouncil.org]
Sent: Thursday, September 25, 2008 4:31 PM
To: Rose, Markus
Subject: Your help needed on Iran blockade resolution

Markus,
I hope you are doing well and are not too stressed.
We're hearing rumors about H Con Res 362 being included in Berman's Iran sanctions bill, which is on the suspension calendar for today. As far as I can tell it's still in draft mode, but they are keeping it pretty hush-hush.
Do you think you could make a call to make sure they keep the blockade language out?
You're the best!
Emily